THE JOHNIMARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

PROTECTING THE GATES OF REASONABLE ROYALTY: A DAMAGES FRAMEWORK FOR
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
MERRITT J. HASBROUCK

ABSTRACT

The reasonable royalty analysis in patent infringement cases remains confusing to juries because of
the numerous and arbitrary methods of calculation. The use of confusing methodologies, such as the
Georgia-Pacificanalysis, the Entire Market Value Rule, and the former 25 percent rule, increase the
risk of overcompensating patentees in patent infringement cases. Without suitable changes to the
reasonable royalty analysis, damages award amounts will continue to increasingly undermine the
incentive for subsequent inventors to create new products. Although the courts have had some
success in establishing new methods, Congress should create a more rigid and clear test for use in
the courts. Clear and predictable patent damages rules created through the powers of the
legislature and the judiciary will lead to fair damages awards and encourage innovation. This
comment proposes a modern framework for determining reasonable royalty damages amounts to
supplant outdated methodologies. This proposed framework includes a rule of apportionment,
combined with strong judicial gatekeeping, to ensure that only reliable evidence based in sound
economic and factual predicates is allowed to reach a jury.
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PROTECTING THE GATES OF REASONABLE ROYALTY: A DAMAGES
FRAMEWORK FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
MERRITT J. HASBROUCK*

"Estimatingthe cost of taking an invention from idea to issued patent is easy.
But determining what that intellectual property is worth once the patent is approved,
is anyone's guess."'

INTRODUCTION

Patents require proper protection through clear guidance from the legislature
and predictable results from the judiciary. 2 Although the courts have made some
progress in other areas of patent law, one troublesome area remains: the appropriate
Clear and
standard for determining a reasonable royalty damages amount.3
predictable patent damages rules that lead to fair damages awards encourage
subsequent inventors to improve upon existing inventions. When the patent laws
allow for overcompensation of patentees through large damages awards, the patent
system provides insufficient incentives to these inventors. 4
*C Merritt J. Hasbrouck 2011. J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The John Marshall Law School,
Chicago, IL. Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering, magna cum laude, North Carolina
Agricultural & Technical State University, 2000; Master of Business Administration, The
Pennsylvania State University, 2003. I would like to thank my parents, Merritt J. Hasbrouck Sr.
and Brenda G. Hasbrouck, and my sister, Shannon D. Hasbrouck, for their steadfast support and
patience. I would like to specifically thank Brian Jones, Kristina Swanson, and Anthonie Moll for
their editing support. Finally, thank you to the staff of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law for their invaluable editorial assistance. Any mistakes in this comment are my own.
1Jameson Berkow, Unlocking the Mysteries of Patent Valuation, FIN. POST TECH DESK (Oct. 7,
2011 5:57 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/2011/10/07/how-do-you-determine-the-price-of-apatent/.
2Erick S. Lee, Historical Perspectives on Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages and Current
Congressional Efforts for Reform, 2009 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 2 (2009) (stating that "future
versions of patent reforms must take care to ensure compliance with. . . historical concerns").
3Id. (stating that the various methodologies for calculating a reasonable royalty have created
controversy and have been blamed as a reason for failure of attempted patent reform); Patent
Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions Patent: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Kappos] (statement of David J.
Kappos, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, IBM Corp.); see Steven Pearlstein, What
Smartphone Makers can Teach Legislators, WASH. POST, June 11, 2008, at Dl,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/10/AR200806 1003 133.html
("rPatent reform] was a response to widespread complaints that by tilting too heavily in favor of
existing patent holders, a patent system meant to encourage innovation was beginning to stifle it.");
Stephen Albainy-denei, Patent Changes: Coming and Going, PAT. B3ARISTAS (M~ay 7, 2008),
http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2008/05/07/patent-changes-coming-and-going/
('A
problematic area was a proposed change to the award of damages under the provision for
Reasonable Royalty Damages.").
4Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1, 3 (2009) (statement of Philip S. Johnson, Chief
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The litigation of patent infringement suits costs the economy approximately $4.5
billion annually.o Furthermore, the number of patent infringement suits filed
annually has increased over time. 6 Of those patent infringement suits, litigation
costs and damages awards have also increased substantially.7 From 1994 to 2004,
the number of patent cases increased from 1617 to 3075.8 In 2009 the median cost
for a plaintiff and a defendant to take a patent infringement suit through trial with
less than $1 million at risk was $650,000; in a suit with $1million to $25 million at
risk, the median cost was $2.5 million; and in a suit with more than $25 million at
risk, the median cost was $5.5 million.9 Also in 2009, a jury in the Eastern District of
Texas awarded one of the largest patent infringement damage awards ever, at $1.67
billion.10 In the first half of 2008, the aggregate of the top seven damages awards
totaled close to $1.5 billion."

Intellectual Property Counsel, Johnson & Johnson) ("[P]atents should be promptly and reliably
enforceable against infringers, and result in damages awards that fairly compensate for the
unauthorized uses made of the patented inventions."); Letter from Hon. Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senate,
and twenty-three other Senators to Hon. Harry Reid, U.S. Senate Majority Leader (Sept. 15, 2010),
("Patents
available at http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/20100915_pjl etal to reid.pdf
granted represent jobs for the American people ... [s]trengthening our patent system and spurring
innovation is an action we should take now to stimulate our economy.").
5 Kappos, supra note 3, at 2; T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard
Patents: Some PreliminaryEvidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 240, 401 (2010); Robert Weber, Op-Ed,

Congress:

Reform

Those

Patents,

FORBES,

Dec.

26,

2007,

at

1,

available

at

http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/24/ibm-patents-congress-oped-cx-rwe_1226ibm.html.
I)Kappos, supra note 3, at 7.
7Id. at 2.
8Id.; see ARON LEVKO ET AL., A CLOSER LOOK, 2008 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: DAMAGES
AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES AND TIME TO TRIAL 1 (2008) [hereinafter LEVKO ET AL. 2008], available at
http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/assets/2008_patentlitigation-study.pdf;
ARON
LEVKO ET AL., A CLOSER LOOK, 2009 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: PATENT LITIGATION TRENDS AND
THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 4 (2009) [hereinafter LEVKO ET AL. 2009],
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2009-patentlitigation-study.pdf; J. SHAWN MCGRATH & KATHLEEN M. KEDROWSKI, TRENDS IN PATENT DAMAGES
1 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles.html.
9Kappos, supra note 3, at 2; see LEVKO ET AL. 2008, supra note 8, at 1; LEVKO ET AL. 2009,
supra note 8, at 4; MCGRATH & KEDROWSKI, supra note 8, at 1; AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, 2009
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2009) (including costs such as outside legal and paralegal
services, local counsel, associates, paralegals, travel and living expenses, fees and costs for court
reporters, photocopies, courier services, exhibit preparation, analytical testing, expert witnesses,
translators, surveys, jury advisors, and similar expenses).
10Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 669 F. Supp. 2d 756, 774 (E.D. Tex. 2009) rev'd,

2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3514, at *30 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2011) (reversing the district court because the
claims at issue were found invalid for lack of written description, but not discussing the damages

award.); see Jim Edwards, 3000 Abbott Workers Losing Their Jobs May Have Patent Lawyers to
Blame, BNET, Sept. 21, 2010, available at http://www.bnet.com/blog/drug-business/3000-abbottworkers-losing-their-jobs-may-have-patent-lawyers-to-blame/5826.
11RICHARD F. CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE: A LITIGATOR'S GUIDE TO
ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER DAMAGE STRATEGIES xiii (Oxford University Press 2009); Jay P.

Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the
Adjudication and Settlement of PatentDisputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 278-79 (2006) ('Among all
cases filed in 2000, fourteen awarded damages in excess of $1 million.

.. )
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One of the main reasons for this increase is that the reasonable royalty analysis
does not provide clear guidance for juries making damages determinations.12
Without suitable changes to the reasonable royalty analysis, damages award
amounts will continue to increase and undermine the incentive for subsequent
inventors to innovate.' 3 Additionally, because of the potential for obtaining large
damages awards, the disparity between the use of jury trials, as compared to bench
trials, has increased substantially.14 This increase in patent jury trials will require
juries to make more damages determinations, thereby increasing the potential for
large damages verdicts to be awarded.' 5
This comment will discuss the current trend in the law with respect to making
reasonable royalty damages determinations, particularly from the legislature and the
judiciary. Part I provides an explanation of a reasonable royalty, as well as an
overview of the history and background of the more common methods for calculating
a reasonable royalty amount. Part II analyzes these methods in the context of jury
trials. Part III proposes a number of steps the legislature and judiciary should take
to ensure that juries receive quality information for making reasonable royalty
damages determinations. Finally, the comment concludes with an overview of the
issues and solutions.

I. BACKGROUND
This comment begins with an outline of the more common methods of
determining a reasonable royalty damages amount. Next, is a brief history of the
various reasonable royalty analyses generally in patent infringement cases including
the Georgia-Pacific factors, the Entire Market Value Rule ("EMVR"), and the 25
percent rule. Part I.A.1 discusses the problems with the Georgia-Pacific analysis.
Part I.A.2 discusses the problems with the EMVR analysis. Part I.A.3 discusses the
problems with the 25 percent rule. Part I.B discusses the legislature's failed
attempts to reform the reasonable royalty analysis. Finally, Part I.C discusses the
trend in recent case law for determining reasonable royalty damages amounts.

A. History of the Reasonable Royalty Analysis
Currently, the reasonable royalty calculation is the predominant methodology
for calculating a damages amount in patent infringement cases.16 Until the recent
passage of the America Invents Act ("AIA"), the damages section of the Patent
12Kappos, supra note 3, at 7; 154 CONG. REC. S9983 (daily edi. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Jon Kyl) [hereinafter Kyl] (" [T]here is room for improvement in current law .. . [s]ome unsound
practices have crept into United States patent damages litigation").
Is Kappos, supra note 3, at 7; Kyl, supra note 12, at S9983.
' LEVKO ETAL. 2009, supra note 8, at 1.
15Id.

16TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986); LEVKO ET AL. 2009, supra
note 8, at 5; Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d1 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that the
more common approach for calculating a reasonable royalty is the hypothetical negotiation).
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Statute had not been amended since its passage in 1952.17 Section 284 of the statute
requires that a court "award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty."' 8 The purpose of
section 284 is to set a floor below which the damages amount should not fall and the
courts are not authorized to go.' 9 In calculating a reasonable royalty, trial evidence
commonly centers around the value of the patented invention in the hands of the
infringer. 20 The focus on the infringer's acts, however, is seemingly unrelated to
compensating the inventor, creating confusion amongst juries tasked with calculating
a reasonable royalty amount. 2 1
Current law gives no clear explanation for calculation of a reasonable royalty
amount. 22 There is a general consensus that current law provides juries with
insufficient information for determining a reasonable royalty. 23 Often juries are
given little guidance in calculating a reasonable royalty amount and are forced to use
a confusing list of fifteen Georgia-Pacificfactors with the expectation that they will
calculate a fair damages award. 24 The significant increase in the number of cases
decided by juries exacerbates the problem. 25
The House Judiciary Committee identified the flaws in the reasonable royalty
analysis as one of the keys for reform of the damages calculation. 26 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") also recognized the
problems with the reasonable royalty analysis in that reasonable royalty awards

1735 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In
either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of
damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances.
Id.
18Id.; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1340 (vacating and remanding a jury award as excessive); Crystal
Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelecs. Int'1, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Fromson
v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
19Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
20See e.g., Serpentix Conveyor Corp. v. Roth, 726 F. Supp. 282, 285-86 (D. Colo. 1989)
(recognizing the substantial value of a patent to the infringer, but awarding only a one dollar
reasonable royalty because the infringer did not manufacture or sell the infringing product);
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 670 F. Supp. 861, 869 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (basing
damage award on invention).
21 Serpentix Conveyor Corp., 726 F. Supp. at 285-86; Fromson, 670 F. Supp. at 869.
22COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, CLARIFICATION OF THE "REASONABLE ROYALTY"
STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL TO UNLEASH INNOVATION AND PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2009),

available at http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/whitepapers/DamagesFINAL.pdf.
23 COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 2.
24S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11-12 (2008).
25
LEVKO ETMA. 2009, supra note 8, at 8.
26S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 26.
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have exceeded the infringer's entire profit on the infringing product or service. 27
These problems are compounded by the large disparity between damages awarded by
judges as compared to juries. 28 Since 2001, the median award for jury trials has been
more than ten times the median award by judges as compared to one-and-a-half
times the median award in the prior twenty years. 29 The median jury award has
increased by 124 percent in just the last few years alone.30
A prevailing patentee in a patent infringement case is entitled to no less than a
reasonable royalty on the infringer's sales. 3 ' A reasonable royalty provides a just
recovery to patentees when they cannot prove lost profits or an established royalty. 32
Litigants routinely adopt two approaches for calculating a reasonable royalty. The
first, the analytical method, focuses on the infringer's projections of profit for the
infringing product.33
The second, more common approach, is known as the
hypothetical negotiation. 34 The hypothetical negotiation is often referred to as a
willing licensee/licensor negotiation.3 5 In a hypothetical negotiation the court must
determine the licensing terms that willing licensors and licensees would have agreed
to at the time of infringement.3 6 The hypothetical licensing terms are the royalty
rate and the royalty base.3 7 The reasonable royalty damages amount is calculated by
multiplying the royalty rate by the royalty base.3 8

27Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Although an infringer's
anticipated profit from use of the patented invention is 'among factors to be considered in
determining' a reasonable royalty, ... the law does not require that an infringer be permitted to
make a profit."); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
is no rule that a reasonable royalty be no higher than the infringer's net profit margin.").
("There
28
LEVKO ET AL. 2008, supra note 8, at 6.
29

d.

30 Id.
31 35

U.S.C. § 284 (2006).

1-20 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.07 (2007).
'33See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
32

34Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
3 Id.

36See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1914) (finding that "it
was permissible to show the value by proving what would have been a reasonable royalty"); RiteHite, 56 F.3d at 1554; Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassidy, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1894)
(finding 'where damages cannot be assessed upon the basis of a royalty, nor on that of lost sales, nor
on that of hurtful competition, the proper method of assessing them is to ascertain what would have
been a reasonable royalty to have paid"); see also Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., Inc., 69 F.3d
512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("A reasonable royalty is defined as the amount that a willing licensor and
licensee would bargain for at an arm's length hypothetical negotiation occurring on the date the
infringement began."); but see Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554 (holding that "the hypothetical negotiation
is often referred to as a willing licensor/willing licensee negotiation. However, this is an inaccurate,
and even absurd, characterization when . . . the patentee does not wish to grant a license").
'7 CHiIM, supra note 32, § 20.07.
38Code-Alarm, Inc. v.Electromotive Techs. Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13031, *1,8 (Fed. Cir.
dun. 4, 1997) (finding that a reasonable royalty consisted of a '[royalty rate] applied to the entire
royalty base"); Rite-Hlite, 56 F.3d at 1555 (affirming the trial court's calculation of a reasonable
royalty rate and remanding for a redetermination of the royalty base, based only on the sale of the
infringing restraints.).
Reasonable Royalty Amount = Royalty Rate x Royalty Base. The Royalty
Base can be calculated by utilizing the Georgia-Pacificfactors and/or the EMVR. The Royalty Rate
can be calculated by using the Georgia-Pacificfactors and/or the former 25 percent rule.

[11:192 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

198

The Federal Circuit identified the hypothetical negotiation as an absurd
characterization because the patentee may never have been a willing licensor." The
hypothetical negotiation is used to determine a reasonable royalty without the actual
willingness of the parties taken into account. 40 The Federal Circuit noted that the
willing licensee/licensor approach must be flexibly applied as a "device in the aid of
justice," although there is no actual willingness by either of the parties. 41
The methods for determining damages awards have always involved a difficult
analysis combined with complex rules. 42 Various methods exist for calculating a
reasonable royalty rate and royalty base. These methods produce unpredictable and
inflated awards due to inherently confusing or arbitrary frameworks. 43 Once a jury
grants a large damages award, it is extremely difficult to petition the court for a
reduction because "a jury's supportable finding of the amount of damages must be
upheld unless the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous." 44 Three of the most
commonly utilized reasonable royalty calculation methods include the GeorgiaPacific analysis, the EMVR to determine the royalty base, and the former 25 percent
rule to determine the royalty rate. 45

B. Reasonable Royalty CalculationMethods

1. The Problem with Calculating a Reasonable Royalty Amount Using the GeorgiaPacific Factors
The first major method of calculating a reasonable royalty is to utilize the fifteen
Georgia-Pacificfactors. 46 The Georgia-Pacific analysis also involves the use of the
hypothetical negotiation, which is expressed under the fifteenth factor. 47 The
'3 Rite-Hite,
40 Id.

4' Id.
42

56 F.3d at 1554 n.13.

Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(determining a "fair and reasonable royalty is ... a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to involve
more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge"); Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 794
F. Supp. 1370, 1394 (E.D. Wis. 1992) ("Determining a reasonable royalty from a hypothetical
negotiation is not easy; the process is truly artificial.").
4 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Uniloc Il').
44Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 563 F.3d 1358, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
4 Additional methods, which are not discussed in this article, for calculating a reasonable
royalty include the following: (1) an industry average license used as a starting point for calculating
the value of a patent; (2) a patent portfolio average whereby every high-technology patent is entitled
to one percent of the revenues on a product, made famous by IBM; and (3) a use of comparables,
whereby the value of a patent is calculated by reference to the license paid for a supposedly
comparable patent. Kyl, supra note 12, at S9982-83.
46Georgia-Pacific,318 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
47Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d 1538, 1554
(Fed. Cir. 1995) ('That isnot to say that the 'analytical method' is not considered in the context of a
hypothetical negotiation; itmay well be."); Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v.Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886)
('The focus of damages analysis is through litigation to assess the difference between [the
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hypothetical negotiation analysis may consider a wide range of evidence in relation to
the Georgia-Pacific factors.48 The evidence utilized in the analysis consists of facts
either preceding or even subsequent to the hypothetical negotiation date. 49

patentee's] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if
the infringement had not occurred.").
48Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120-21. The court compiled fourteen evidentiary factors
and a fifteenth factor that, taken together, restate the hypothetical negotiation methodology from "a
conspectus of the leading cases," including:
(1) The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
(2) The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to
the patent in suit.
(3) The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
(4) The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his
patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
(5) The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or
whether they are inventor and promoter.
(6) The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or
convoyed sales.
(7) The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
(8) The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
(9) The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
(10) The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those
who have used the invention.
(11) The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and
any evidence probative of the value of that use.
(12) The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in
the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
(13) The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the
infringer.
(14) The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
(15) The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such
as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if
both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is,
the amount which a prudent licensee-who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.

Id.
49Lucent Techs. v.Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333-34 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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The analysis is so complex that courts recognize that "any reasonable royalty
analysis necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty."o
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has noted the difficulty of determining a reasonable
royalty using the Georgia-Pacific analysis because it requires "the talents of a
conjurer [rather] than those of a judge."5 1 The factors do not give clear guidance on
how to calculate damages awards because there is no standardized way to apply or
prioritize the factors. 52 "Jurors also appear to be confounded by the Georgia-Pacific
factors, what they mean, and how to apply them. As a consequence ... jurors tend to
ignore them."5 3
Legal scholars agree that the Georgia-Pacific factorial analysis is one of the
main culprits causing confusion in damages calculations. 54 Professor Tom Cotter
from University of Minnesota Law School, observed that the "Georgia-Pacific
factors . . . can be easily manipulated by the trier of fact to reach virtually any

outcome." 55 A potential infringer is exposed to a huge risk of being subjected to a
large damages award because the courts do not set aside a jury's damages
determination "unless the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous."5 6
The courts have made some strides in clearing up the confusion surrounding the
Georgia-Pacificanalysis, but scholars suggest more aggressive action should still be
taken.5 7 One current trend is that the licenses considered in the analysis must be
sufficiently comparable, in circumstances and technology, to the hypothetical license

5o Id. at 1325; i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 857-58 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
51Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 691 F. Supp. 2d 566, 574 (D. Del. 2010).
52Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325.
5 Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge, The Real Problem with Patent Infringement
Damages, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 484, 489 (2009).
4 Paul M. Janicke, HIPLA Professor of Law, Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr., Remarks at the Federal
Trade Commission Hearing On: The Evolving IP Marketplace-Remedies, Panel 1: Standards for
Assessing Patent Damages and Their Implementation by Courts 1, at 15 (Feb. 11, 2009), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/090211transcript.pdf
(stating "we're still
using the Georgia-Pacific grab bag ... [t]his is where we need to tighten up damages law. The
approach of throwing fifteen factors to the jury could be why we are getting erratic results. It does
not lend itself to predictable results. I think that should be abandoned"); see 4-86 MODERN FEDERAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL P, SUBSTANTIVE CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS:
PATENTS 86.04 [hereinafter
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]

("In determining the reasonable

royalty, you should

consider all facts known and available to the parties at the time the infringement began, which is
the time when the royalty would have been negotiated. The following [Georgia-Pacificfactors] are
among the kinds of factors that might have influenced the royalty.").
5Tom Cotter, Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Remarks at the
Federal Trade Commission Hearing On: The Evolving IP Marketplace-Remedies, Panel 1:
Standards for Assessing Patent Damages and Their Implementation by Courts 1, at 39 (Feb. 11,
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/090211transcript.pdf.
56 Id. at 40; Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d
1341, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
87 Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, Inc. & Intel Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant at 3, Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 07-CV-2000);
Janicke, supra note 54, at 63.
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at issue.5 8 For example, in Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the plaintiff relied on
portfolio licenses, each covering numerous patents issued to IBM, to establish both
the royalty base and royalty rate.59 There was no attempt to establish that such
portfolio licenses provided similar licensing rights to similar patented inventions, as
compared to a hypothetical license for the patents in suit.6 0

2. The Problem with Calculatinga Reasonable Royalty Amount Using the EMVR
Just like the Georgia-Pacific method, the EMVR requires that the royalty rate
be multiplied by a royalty base. 6 ' Under the EMVR, however, a patentee can
determine the royalty base by using the entire market value of the infringing product
rather than the value of the patented feature infringed. 62 The entire market value of
the infringing product can be used only where the patented feature creates the basis
for customer demand or substantially creates the value of the component parts.6 3
This rule is derived from Supreme Court precedent requiring evidence
apportioning the infringer's profits between the patented and unpatented features. 64
This evidence must be reliable and tangible, not conjectural or speculative.6 5
Moreover, such evidence must show that the entire market value of the whole
infringing product is properly attributable to the patented feature. 66
58 Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that either type
of agreement can be relevant as long as there is "some basis for comparison" between the past
licenses and the hypothetical license); ResQNet.com v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (finding that "[N]one of these licenses even mentioned the patents in suit or showed any other
discernible link to the claimed technology"); Wordtech Sys. v. Integrated Network Solutions, 609
F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding that the past licenses "provide[d] no basis for comparison
with [the] infringing sales" and did not describe the method for calculating the lump sum, the
licensees' intended products, or the expected sales); Ricoh Co. Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27301, at *25 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 2010) (finding that a proponent must show how
the multiple-patent license is comparable).
59Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1328.
60 Id.

I1Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 ("Litigants routinely adopt several approaches for calculating a
reasonable royalty."); see TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(describing the analytical method as "[subtracting] the infringer's usual or acceptable net profit from
its anticipated net profit realized from sales of infringing devices"); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557
(Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The determination of a reasonable royalty, however, is based not on the infringer's
profit, but on the royalty to which a willing licensor and a willing licensee would have agreed at the
time the infringement began.").
62 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
63 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120-21 ("rT]here is a basic distinction between a patent
which is only part of a machine or structure and which creates only a part of the profits and a
patented article or a patent which gives the entire value to the combination or an article patented as
an entirety."); CAULEY, supra note 11, at 7; Uniloc II, 632 F.3d1 at 1318; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336;
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549-50.
0'Uniloc II,632 F.3d at 1318; Garretson v.Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884).
65 Uniloc II, 632 F.3d at 1318.
66 Id.
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The EMVR adds additional confusion to the reasonable royalty analyses.6 7
Historically, the EMVR was developed in actions seeking disgorgement of an
infringer's profits.68
The EMVR was always applied in conjunction with
apportionment instructions.6 9 The use of the EMVR in reasonable royalty cases,
without a charge of apportionment, creates perplexing jury instructions and
erroneous results.7 0 This is the case, even with a final instruction that the jury may
not award damages based on the entire revenue from all the accused products."
Such a disclosure can only skew the damages calculation for the jury, regardless of
the contribution of the patented component. 72
The EMVR originated in Supreme Court case law involving claims to an
equitable accounting of an infringer's profits.73 In Garretson v. Clark,74 the patentee
sought to recover the defendant's profits on sales of an improved method for clamping
a mop to a mop head. 75 The Supreme Court held that such profits could not be
recovered because the patentee failed to produce any evidence apportioning the
profits between the patented feature and the patented invention.7 6 Further, the
Court held that a patentee must provide proper evidence. 7 7 The patentee had to
apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages between the patented
feature and the unpatented features.7 8 Alternatively, the patentee could show that

67Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, supra note 57, at 3.
68Garretson, 11 U.S. at 121.
The patentee . . . must in every case give evidence tending to separate

or

apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's damages between the
patented feature and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable
and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must show, by equally
reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to be
calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the whole
machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the
patented feature.
Id.; Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV.
263, 270 (2007); Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1661, 1697 (2010).
69 Id.
70 THE NATIONAL JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS

(2009)

[hereinafter

NATIONAL

JURY

INSTRUCTION

PROJECT],

1, 65-66
available
at

("This
http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJurylnstructions.pdf
framework based on the fifteen Georgia-Pacificfactors, is both wide-ranging and non-exclusive, and
is thus subject to widely differing interpretation and, sometimes, misuse or abuse by parties and
their experts."); Uniloc II, 632 F.3d at 1320 (stating that there is a "danger of admitting
consideration of the entire market value of the accused [device] where the patented component does
not create the basis for customer demand").
7i Uniloc II, 632 F.3d at 1320.
721d.

73Garretson, 11 U.S. at 121.
" Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.

'7Id.
78 Id.
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the profits and damages were to be calculated on the whole machine if the entire
value was attributable to the patented feature.'"
Under Supreme Court precedent, the EMVR and "apportionment" were integral
parts of the Court's jurisprudence concerning the disgorgement remedy.80 Modern
reasonable royalty cases, however, are currently not applying apportionment.8 '
Jurors receive instruction containing the EMVR, but are given no instruction on
apportionment. 82

3. The Problem with Calculatinga Reasonable Royalty Amount Using the Former
25 Percent Rule
The Federal Circuit recently held that the 25 percent rule is a fundamentally
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.8 3
Despite being overturned, the 25 percent rule is still useful to illustrate the difficulty
in calculating a reasonable royalty.
The 25 percent rule especially created
complexity when combined with the Georgia-Pacificfactors. The 25 percent rule was
used to approximate the reasonable royalty rate that the manufacturer of a patented
product would be willing to offer to pay to the patentee during a hypothetical
negotiation. 84 The 25 percent rule suggested that a patentee receives a royalty rate,
often between one quarter and one third, of the infringer's profits for the patent at
issue. 85 The rule did not utilize the hypothetical negotiation or a reasonable royalty
rate involving any particular technology, industry, or party.86
A common approach for a plaintiffs damages experts was to apply the 25
percent rule to reach a starting point royalty.87 The experts would next consider the
Georgia Pacific factors without making significant changes to the starting point

9 Id. ("Because requiring infringers to disgorge profits was a harsh remedy if the infringed
patent covered only a small component in a larger machine the Court required plaintiffs to
apportion the profits between components or show "the entire value of the whole machine . . . is
attributable to the patented feature.").
80 Id. at 121.
8 Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
82 Id.
83

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that
evidence relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal
Rules of Evidence because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue).
84 Id.
85Goldscheider et al., Use of the 25 Percent Rule in Valuing IP, 37 LES NOUVELLES 123, 123
(Dec. 2002); Kyl, supra note 12, at S9982-83 ('LA]n infringed patent is presumptively entitled to 40
percent or some other standard portion of all of the profits on a product."); Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d1 147, 150 (D.R.J. 2009), rev'd, 632 F.3d1 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law
(' Uniloc I');
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.d. 1583, 1612 (2009) ("Iif there are five patents relevant to a complex
product, all the profit would go to patent licensors applying this 'rule of thumb."').
8GGoldscheider et al., supra note 85, at 123; Uniloc I,632 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
87ERJC E. BENSEN, BENSEN ON PATENT DAMAGES LANDMARK RULING: UNILOC USA, LTD. V.
MICROSOFT CORP. 1 (Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter BENSEN ON UNILoc], available at 2011 Emerging
Issues 5500.
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royalty.8 8 The expert would then compare the contemplated royalty to total revenues
or the entire market value for the accused product as a check of its reasonableness. 8"
Utilizing the 25 percent rule as a starting point before applying the GeorgiaPacific method, or even the EMVR, ensures that damages determinations begin and
end in an erroneous damages determination.90 To begin with an arbitrary method
like the 25 percent royalty rate and combine it with an accurate calculation for the
royalty base will nevertheless result in a faulty award. 9 '

C. CongressionalPatent Reform
The reasonable royalty damages provision in the amended version of The Patent
Reform Act of 2009 retained the gatekeeper role of the court. 92 Under this
amendment, a court was required to identify and consider only the methodologies
and factors that were relevant to the damages determination.93 Also, those more
clear methodologies and factors must be included in the parties' proposed jury
instructions. 94 Furthermore, a court was required to consider only factors having a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis. 95
Judges have the inherent role as gatekeepers in the courts.96 This gatekeeper
role requires district courts to closely scrutinize the evidence that is relied upon to
prove patent damages.97 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 a judge can hold a
Daubert hearing to limit or exclude expert testimony that does not meet the
standards of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.9 8
The Patent Reform Act of 2011 supported the requirements outlined by the 2009
Act.9 9 The Patent Reform Act of 2011 required additional procedural control by the
courts. 0 0 The 2011 Act required a court to identify and consider methodologies and
88 Id.
89 Id.

90 Id.

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
92Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (as reported by Mr. Leahy, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009).
93Id.
9'

91 Id.

9, Id.; Michael J. Kasdan & Joseph Casino, Update to Recent Patent Damages Article,
PATENTLYO BLOG (Mar. 31, 2010 7:56 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/guest-postupdate-to-recent-patent-damages-article.html.
96 S. 515.

97Id.
98John M. Mintz & John A. Squires, Federal Circuit Kills the "25% Rule" for Reasonable
5,
2011),
& Parke
L.L.P.
(Jan.
Damages
Calculations, Chadbourne
Royalty
http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/441c65fl-8531-4bc9-96b006a358ff4901/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8e l23231-2508-4cOd-aea909b74429eabf/IPo20Cliento20Alert.pdf.
99The Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. (as reported by Mr. Leahy, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2011); see Patent Reform Act of 2011: An Overview, PATENTLYO BLOG (Feb.
2:06PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/201 1/02/patent-reform-act-of-201 1-an10,
2011
overview.htm1.
ToS. 23.

[11:192 2011]

Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty:
A Damages Framework for Patent Infringement Cases

205

factors that were relevant to the determination of damages, just as in the 2009 Act.101
The 2011 Act also required courts to consider whether a party's damages contentions
had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis before introduction into evidence.102 This
gatekeeping function is consistent with the Federal Circuit's recent holdings
requiring substantial evidence to calculate a reasonable royalty amount where the
patented feature creates the "basis for customer demand" or "substantially creates
the value of the component parts." 03
The recent passage of the AIA is an indication that patent reform is possible.1 04
The AlA, however, does not sufficiently address the issue of damages or the method
of calculating a reasonable royalty amount in patent infringement cases.105 What's
"missing from the [AlA] is . . . an initiative to replace the system of determining
damages and, in so doing, reduce the amount of huge jury awards." 06

D. The Current Trend in the Courts for Determining a Reasonable Royalty Amount
Although Congress believes that it can effect patent damages reform, the courts
have a differing opinion. The Federal Circuit's recent decisions reflect that the
judiciary can self-regulate without Congressional involvement as noted in its
statement that there is no "one size fits all" statute that would be effective in every
patent infringement case.107
Several recent cases hold that to determine a
reasonable royalty amount, the parties "must carefully tie proof of damages to the
claimed invention's footprint in the marketplace." 0 8 Judges should use their already
existing, yet underutilized, gatekeeper powers to ensure that only reliable evidence
based in sound economic and factual predicates will be allowed into evidence.109

101Id.

102Id.; America Invents Act, No. 112-29 (Sept. 16, 2011).
103Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
104See America Invents Act, No. 112-29; see also Press Release, The White House Office of the
Press Sec'y, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to
Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept.
16, 2011) (stating the America Invents Act will help businesses, inventors, and entrepreneurs
because the USPTO will offer new ways to avoid litigation regarding patent validity, at costs
significantly less expensive than going to court), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the -pressoffice/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
105America Invents Act, No. 112-29; see Scott M. Fulton III, Patent Reform Passes the Senate
with
Teeth,
Heart
Missing,
READWRITEWEB
(Sept.
9,
2011
7:16
AM),
http://www.readwriteweb.com/enterprise/2011/09/patent-reform-passes-the-senat.php
(stating
"missing from the [AIA] is . . . an initiative to replace the system of determining damages and, in so
doing, reduce the amount of huge jury awards").
10o Id.

107Id
108 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Grain
Processing Corp. v. Am. M~aize-Prods. Co., 185 Ft.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. (Dir. 1999) ('To prevent the
hypothetical from lapsing into pure speculation, this court requires sound economic proof of the
nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the economic picture.").
109 Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, Business Law Forum: Intellectual Property Remedies:
A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 635
(2010) ('Despite the existence of the Daubert framework that permits judges to serve as gatekeepers
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Judges can control this evidence through existing Daubert"t0 court procedures. The
courts have explained that damages awards should be based only on "sound economic
and factual predicates.""'
In IP Innovation, L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc.,112 Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit,
sitting by designation in the Eastern District of Texas, similarly held that the
reasonable royalty analysis must consider licenses that are tied to the economic value
of the infringed product.113 The court applied the principles established in both
Lucent and ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, in excluding the opinion of an expert witness
for improperly relying on general royalty rates in the software industry and
improperly applying the EMVR.114 The court held that expert testimony on damages
will not be allowed without "a firm basis in accepted economic principles with an eye
to the facts."115
Among the methods that can potentially confuse a jury are the Georgia-Pacific
analysis, the EMVR, and the former 25 percent rule.116 Where there is confusion
among the jury, the greater the potential to see exorbitant jury awards.117 The trend
in runaway damage awards doled out by juries will cease only when a clear
framework to analyze a reasonable royalty is provided to juries.

II. ANALYSIS
Congress, through Patent Reform, should continue to develop an appropriate
damages analysis that will provide clearer guidance for juries when determining
damages awards.118 The judiciary, through recent case law, has also attempted to
provide a clearer framework for juries when calculating damages awards.119
in evaluating expert testimony, thirty-six actual exclusions of testimony on patent damages are
rare.").
110Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
111Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 870-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Letter
from Hon. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to Hon.
Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senate, and Hon. Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senate (May 3, 2007), available at
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments/patentdamages/05-03-07Michelletter.pdf;
Letter from
Hon. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to Shanna Winters,
Chief Counsel, Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Prop. (June 7, 2007), available
at http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/Winters.ltr.pdf.
112 IF Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
113 Id.
iId. at 689-691.
't Id. at 691.
116Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
117 CAULEY, supra note 11, at xiii; Kesan & Ball, supra note 11, at 278-79.
118Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (as reported by Mr. Leahy, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. (as reported by Mr. Leahy, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2011); see Patent Reform Act of 2011: An Overview, PATENTLYO
BLOG (Feb. 10, 2011 2:06PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/patent-reform-act-of-2011an-overview.html; America Invents Act, No. 112-29 (Sept. 16, 2011).
no Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d1 1301, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009); ResQNet.com, Inc. v.
Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010); IP? Innovation L.L.C., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 691; Cornell
Univ., 609 F.Supp.2d at 283.
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Notwithstanding the efforts of Congress and the Judiciary, no clear framework has
emerged. Part 11.A discusses the problems with the Georgia-Pacific analysis. Part
II.B analyzes why the EMVR is an inappropriate method for calculating a reasonable
royalty amount.

A. The Georgia-Pacific Factors Provide No Clear Guidance to Juries
The reasonable royalty analysis has been largely popular since the landmark
Georgia-Pacific decision, yet it has often been misapplied for nearly the past forty
years.120 Damages are often calculated with little relation to economics and are often
imposed using arbitrary or confusing methods such as the EMVR and the former 25
percent rule, which have no reasonable relationship to the parties, the patent, the
technology, or the marketplace.121 Misapplication of the Georgia-Pacificfactors can
produce a royalty rate unsupported by economic proof that the patented invention
drove demand for the infringing product.122 Licensing experts merely identify and
utilize the factors that support high or low royalty rates, depending on which ones
benefit their side most.123 When experts intentionally utilize factors that weigh in
their favor, a faulty calculation under the Georgia-Pacific factors can occur.124 In
Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti ChairMfg. Corp.,'125 the court explained that "it would be
an affectation of research to cite the countless cases which simply reiterate the
Georgia-Pacificfactors to be considered in determining a reasonable royalty."126 This
difficult Georgia-Pacificanalysis is illustrated by Lucent.127
In Lucent,128 the Federal Circuit overturned a lump-sum royalty award of $358
million because the original verdict was unsupported by substantial evidence.1 29 The
120CAULEY, supra note 11, at 4-6.
121Id.; Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding

that courts should allow damage awards based only on "sound economic and factual predicates");
NATIONAL JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, supra note 70, at 65-66.
122NATIONAL JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, supra note 70, at 65-66 ("Common mistakes
include mischaracterization of the Georgia-Pacific factors, use of an incorrect (or unarticulated)
hypothetical negotiation date, and inappropriate use of facts that post-date the hypothetical
negotiation."); Roy J. Epstein, & Alan J. Marcus, Economic Analysis of the Reasonable Royalty:
Simplification and Extension of the Georgia-PacificFactors, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY
555, 572-73 (2003), available at http://www.royepstein.com/epstein-marcusjptos.pdf (stating that
"[t]he Georgia-Pacificfactors do not prescribe any particular method for quantifying the appropriate
royalty").
123William Choi & Roy Weinstein, An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty Rate
Calculations, 41 IDEA 49, 50 (2001).
121 Id.
125Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 943 F. Supp. 201, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
126Id. (implying that it was unnecessary to list the well-known Georgia-Pacific factors in the
opinion even though they were being applied by the court); Wordtech Systems, Inc v. Integrated
Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580
Ft.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 Ft.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
127Id.

128Lucent, 580 F.3d1 at 1327 (holding that "speculation" and "superficial testimony" were
insufficient to support the amount of damages awarded).
129Id. at 1329.
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court determined that Lucent's expert erred in several ways in the lower court.130
First, Lucent's expert relied on license agreements for different products, unrelated
to the one at issue in comparison to the infringed product. 13 1 Second, Lucent's expert
failed to identify documentary evidence or testimony showing the parties'
expectations as to usage of the claimed method. 132 Finally, Lucent's expert did not
explain to the jury why he relied on eight varied license agreements unrelated to the
hypothetical agreement. 133
A dangerous misapplication of the Georgia-Pacific factors occurs when experts
are allowed to select the factors that benefit them most or use evidence of licenses
that have no basis in economics or factual predicates. The Federal Circuit noted that
it could not understand how the jury could have adequately evaluated the probative
value of eight varied licenses, where some of the licenses were radically different
from the hypothetical agreement at issue.134 This is precisely how arbitrary and
enormous reasonable royalty amounts can be awarded.

B. The Entire Market Value Rule Is an InappropriateMethod for Calculating a
Reasonable Royalty Base
Under Supreme Court precedent, the EMVR and "apportionment" were integral
parts of the Court's jurisprudence concerning the disgorgement remedy.135 Modern
reasonable royalty cases, however, are currently not applying apportionment.136
Jurors today are given an EMVR instruction, but are not given an apportionment
charge.13 7
In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,13 8 the Federal Circuit created a "functional unit
test." 3 9 Under the functional unit test, the EMVR may be invoked to award
[A] jury award cannot stand solely on evidence which amounts to little more than
a recitation of royalty numbers, one of which is arguably in the ballpark of the
jury's award, particularly when it is doubtful that the technology of those license
agreements is in any way similar to the technology being litigated.
Id.

130 Id.
131 Id.

132Id.

at 1331.
Lucent did not explain how the fact that the Acer agreement involved eight
patents affects how probative it is of the Microsoft Click for Enhanced Coverage
Linking Searches-Lucent hypothetical negotiation over one patent. Nor is there
any document or testimony upon which a jury could have considered how similar
or dissimilar the patented technology of the Acer agreement is to the invention of
using the date-picker. Nor is there any evidence or testimony about how the
$2.50 per unit rate corresponds to a percentage of the cost of the personal
computers sold under the license agreement.

Id.

1s Id. at

1327.

I1 Id.

135 Id. at 121.
136 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339.
13

Id.

13s

Rite-Hie, 56 F.3d at 1550.
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damages based on any components of an accused device.1 40 Damages may even be
based on components not physically connected to the infringing component, so long as
they "function together" with the patented invention.141 Since Rite-Hite, courts have
frequently applied the EMVR to award damages for components that are
unconnected to, yet function with the infringing element of the accused device.1 42
Even if the court were to restrict the boundaries of the royalty base, the jury still
has the ability to grant exorbitant damages awards by use of arbitrary methods for
calculating a royalty rate.143 By permitting evidence of the total sales of a complex,
multi-component product, the EMVR allows juries to start their damages calculation
with a very large amount, which may bias juries toward over-compensatory damages
awards.144

Using any one of the aforementioned methods could cause confusion, especially
where the three methods are combined to determine a reasonable royalty amount.
Imagine beginning with the Georgia-Pacificfactors to help determine a royalty rate.
Courts will look to those factors and consider each with respect to the case. Courts
typically begin with the parties' suggested royalty rates and determine whether the
factors point to a rate above or below the parties' calculations.145 The courts have no
obvious starting point because parties tend to select only the factors that help their
respective sides.146 Two scholars, Atanu Saha, Senior Vice President of Compass
Lexecon, and Roy Weinstein, President of Micronomics, Inc., analyzed ten cases
where a court utilized the Georgia-Pacificfactors.147 They found that:
Plaintiffs and defendants typically suggested widely divergent rates.
Across these ten cases, the difference between plaintiff and defendant
proposals of reasonable royalties ranged from 4.5 percent to 36.6 percent.
In eight of the ten cases, the court selected a royalty rate falling between
defendant's and plaintiffs suggested rates, sometimes employing what
would appear to be a subjective rationale for arriving at a particular rate.
Courts rarely accept the rate put forward by either side, and therefore must
find their own starting point before adjusting up or down according to the
weight of the evidence.148
Previously, judges would also use other arbitrary analyses like the 25 percent
rule to determine a reasonable royalty rate. Under the former 25 percent rule, for
139 Id.

1H0
Id.

141Id.
112See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,

382 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(allowing damages award for lost profits on sale of syrup used inpatented juice dispenser); RiteHite, 56 F.3d at 1550.
113 See COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, supra note 22, at 2.
11 Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, supra note 57, at 18.
145 Id.
6

'eAtanu Saha & Roy Weinstein, Beyond Georgia-Pacific: The Use of Industry Norms as a
Starting Point for Calculating Reasonable Royalties, MICRONOMICS.COM, at 1-2, available at
http://www.micronomics.com/articles/intellectualproperty_ 2.pdf.
' Id.
148Id.
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example, "[a]n estimate is made of a [hypothetical] licensee's expected profits for the
[patented invention] at issue" in a patent infringement case.149
Those profits are divided by the expected net sales over that same period to
arrive at a profit rate. [Assuming a resulting profit rate of] 16 per[cent],
[that rate would be] multiplied by 25 per[cent] to arrive at a running
royalty rate [under the 25 percent rule]. [T]he resulting royalty rate [in this
case] would be 4 per[cent]. The 4 per[cent] royalty rate is applied to [the
royalty base or] the net sales to arrive at royalty payments due to the
[patentee].150

In addition to these two arbitrary analyses, if the EMVR is utilized to determine
the value of the royalty base, then the reasonable royalty amount could be
exorbitant, even where a smaller royalty rate is applied. Thus, it is critical that
courts utilize their gatekeeper powers to ensure that only reliable evidence showing
that the patented invention is the basis for customer demand is admitted in making
these reasonable royalty determinations.
The Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,'151 case is also an example of how
confusion can be created in reasonable royalty damages determinations leading to
large damages awards. Allowing a consideration of the entire market value of an
infringing product, where the patented component does not create the basis for
customer demand, adds to this confusion.152 In Uniloc, the "$19 billion cat was never
put back into the bag even by Microsoft's cross-examination of and re-direct of the
expert witnesses, and in spite of a final instruction that the jury may not award
damages based on Microsoft's entire revenue from all the accused products in the
case."153 The disclosure that a company has made $19 billion dollars in revenue from
a product that contains an infringing component serves only to encourage the jury to
be less careful in its determination.1 54 This less cautious review operates to skew the
damages analysis for the jury, without regard for the actual contribution value of the
119 Uniloc

USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
150Id. (citing Goldscheider et al., Use of the 25 Percent Rule in Valuing IP, 37 LES NOUVELLES
123, 123 (Dec. 2002)); see also BENSEN ON UNILOC, supra note 87, at 1.
To formulate his opinion, Uniloc's damages expert started with $10, which he took
from an internal Microsoft document suggesting the value of a Product Key was
between $10 and $10,000, and applied the so-called 25 [percent rule]
hypothesizing that the parties would have split the value associated with the
product 25 [percent]/75 [percent] with Uniloc getting the smaller share, or $2.50
per unit. The expert then considered the Georgia-Pacificfactors, but concluded
that they did not warrant any change in the rate that he reached under the 25
[percent rule]. Finally, as a 'check,' the expert compared his opined-to royalty to
total sales of the accused product and, as the royalty equated to a 2.9 [percent]
royalty on overall sales, concluded that the royalty was reasonable.
Id.
' Id. at 1320.
152 Id.;

Versata Software Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102240 (E.D. Tex. Sept.

9, 2011) (stating that courts "do not allow consideration of the entire market value of accused
products for minor patent improvements simply by asserting a low enough royalty rate").
53Uniloc II, 632 F.3d at 1312-13.
154Id.
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patented component.155 Almost any damages award would seem small compared to a
$19 billion dollar profit amount.15
The confusion was exacerbated when the
damages expert implied a relationship between the entire market value of the
accused products and the patent.157
Fortunately, recent rulings emphasize the importance of showing that the
patented feature is a basis for demand, as well as other requirements, in order to
apply the EMVR.158 In Lucent, a jury found Microsoft liable for patent infringement
and awarded $358 million in damages.159 The Federal Circuit vacated the damages
award, remarking that the claimed invention was not the basis for customer
demand.160 "There is nothing inherently wrong with using the market value of the
entire product. . . so long as the [royalty rate] accounts for the proportion of the
[royalty base] represented by the infringing component."11
In Lucent,162 the jury instruction on the EMVR did not explain the relationship
between the EMVR and the reasonable royalty analysis.16 3 The instruction stated
that a party seeking damages "based on the value of an entire product containing
multiple features . . . must show two things: (1) the patented feature is the basis for

consumer demand; and (2) the patent and unpatented components are part of a
single functioning unit."164 The jury instruction used in the case implied that the
damages award must be based on the product's entire market value.165 The
instruction failed to give a direction on how to apportion damages in the event that
there was no need to deny damages based on the product's entire market value.166
When juries are given comparable licenses as high as five to eight percent of the
licensee's revenues, there is a huge risk that they will combine those rates with a
royalty base determined by using the EMVR.16 7 Thus, juries reach a reasonable
royalty amount that bears no reasonable relationship to the value of the patented
feature at issue.1 68
This makes it even more critical for judges to utilize their gatekeeper powers to
prohibit damages evidence lacking the proper foundation. Martha K. Gooding and
William C. Rooklidge, partners in Jones Day's Irvine, California office, make the
following suggestion for parties to take advantage of judges' gatekeeper powers:

155 Id.

at 1312.

156Id.

157Id.
158Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

15 Id.
1601d. at 1340.
161 Id.

162 Id.
163 Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, supra note 57, at 24; see also MODERN FEDERAL JU~RY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 54, at 86.04 (' [T]ossing a grab-bag of sixteen factors to the jurors in hopes
that they can decipher a methodology to calculate a reasonable royalty.").
161 Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, supra note 57, at 24 n.
105 Id.

166Id.
is? Id.
168Id.
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For any issues that survive summary disposition, scrutinize your opponent's
experts and their opinions. An expert's damages analysis 'requires sound
economic and factual predicates.' Do not hesitate to challenge experts or
their opinions with a Daubert motion where the necessary foundation is
lacking. Patentees often rely solely on expert testimony, and winning a
motion to exclude that testimony can eliminate entire categories of damages
or even limit the patentee to nominal damages. 69
70
In Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard,1
the patented invention was a component
of a processor that was one of various parts of a "CPU brick" or server.171 Cornell
University's expert failed to provide economic proof that the patented invention drove
demand for the server. 172

Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation, stopped mid-trial
to conduct a Daubert hearing on the proffered opinion of plaintiffs damages
expert, which relied on the entire market value of the accused HewlettPackard servers as the royalty base.
After noting that the claimed
invention was only a 'component of a component of a part of the server,' the
court excluded the entire market value opinion based on the value of the
server, finding that the expert's methodology failed to "show a sound
economic connection between this broad proffered royalty base and the
claimed invention.'173
Additionally, the court held that: (1) the infringing component must be a basis for
customer demand; (2) infringing and non-infringing components must be sold
together as a single unit or as parts of a complete machine or assembly; and (3)
infringing and non-infringing components must be analogous to a single functioning
unit, but not sold together for mere business advantage.174 Thus, at least in some
cases, a reliable reasonable royalty calculation depends upon trustworthy evidence
of the royalty base and [royalty] rate."175

III. PROPOSAL
Given this recent evolution of case law, there exists the potential to create a
clear reasonable royalty analysis. The elimination of arbitrary methods like the 25
percent rule is a step in the right direction. Utilization of the EMVR is helpful, but
not without a charge of apportionment. In fact, the jury should only be charged with
apportionment when jury instructions explaining how to determine a damages award
169Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge, The Real Problem with Patent Infringement
Damages, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 484, 492-93 (2009).
170 Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).

171iId.

172 Id.

at 289.
& Rooklidlge, supra note 169, 492-93.
1(1 Cornell Univ., 609 F. Supp. 24 at 286-87.
175IF Innovation L.L.C. v.Red Hat, Inc., 705 F.Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
173 Goodling
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are delivered. Requiring substantial evidence tied to the economic value added by
the infringed patent to the infringing product will aid in clarifying the analysis.
Furthermore, a use of comparable licenses based in economic principles should be
used to determine the reasonable royalty rate, thereby reducing the amount of
confusing evidence that reaches the jury. Finally, judges should flex their gatekeeper
powers to ensure that only reliable evidence is considered by a jury when making its
final damages determinations.
This comment proposes a framework for determining reasonable royalty
damages amounts in patent infringement cases. The confusion in calculating a
reasonable royalty amount can be eliminated with the following changes: Part III.A.
explains that the EMVR has no place in the analysis of the royalty base.176 A charge
of apportionment of the economic value added is the only option that should be given
to juries. The EMVR is just one of many results of the apportionment analysis.177
Additionally, the courts should only allow evidence tied to the economic value added
by the infringed patent to the infringing product.178 Next, Part III.B. explains that a
use of comparable licenses based in economic principles should be used to determine
the reasonable royalty rate. Finally, Part III.C. explains that judges should be
required to utilize their gatekeeper powers to prevent unreliable evidence from
reaching a jury.179

A. Apportionment Is the Best Instruction for Determining the Reasonable Royalty Base
The EMVR has no role in the analysis of a reasonable royalty.180 Apportionment
of the economic value added is the appropriate calculation and was historically used
by the courts.181 The resulting royalty base from use of the EMVR amounts to
nothing more than one among several potential results of the apportionment
calculation.182 If the entire market value of an infringing component truly results in
an apportionment base of 100 percent of the value of the infringing product, then
there is no need for a separate EMVR rule.183 There is no need to highlight the
EMVR to a jury because it is already accounted for in the apportionment
calculation.184 Although apportionment is "expressly reflected in Georgia-Pacific's
176Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, supra note 57, at 24, n.6.
177Janicke, supra note 54, at 42.
178James Elacqua, Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom L.L.P., et al., Conference on Evolving
Damages Law Hosted by the Berkely Center for Law & Technology & The Federal Circuit Bar
Association,
Trial
Lawyer
Panel
28-30
(Oct.
18,
2010),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bcltPatentDamagesTrialAttorneysPanel.ppt.
1(9 Kappos, supra note 3, at 16.
18o Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, supra note 57, at 24 n.6.
181 Janicke, supra note 54, at 42 ("rT]ell the jury that some portion of the value added is what
they ought to award in light of the Constitutional purpose .. ,. and I would throw out everything
else."); see Eric E . Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary Patent Damages Cases, 10
VA. J.L. & TECH 8, 2 (2005).
182Brief for Bank of Am. Corp. Coverity, supra note 57, at 24 n.6.
183aId.
18s Janicke, supra note 54, at 63 ("[T]he entire market value is really a meaningless cliche that
we should get rid of."); but see, Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339 (holding that "[t]here is nothing inherently
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thirteenth factor, treating apportionment merely as a factor in the reasonable royalty
analysis where it may be given more or less weight or ignored altogether, is
insufficient to meet long-standing apportionment requirements."185 Congress should
go further and require that apportionment be a threshold determination in every
reasonable royalty analysis.186
It is important to encourage judicial application of this evidentiary threshold.
The reach of patent protection afforded an invention should not extend beyond the
actual invention and onto unrelated components of a product, unless the invention is
"the basis for customer demand."187 When evidence truly shows that an invention is
the basis for customer demand, reasonable royalty damages amounts will begin to
more accurately reflect legitimate damages awards.188

B. Economically Comparable Licenses Must be Used to Determine the Royalty Rate
Even after an appropriate royalty base is calculated, based on a jury instruction
of apportionment, the jury still has the ability to use a higher royalty rate. 89 This
would nullify any restriction on the base.19 0 The way to prevent the use of an
arbitrary royalty rate is by use of comparable licenses based in economic
principles.191

Furthermore, the royalty determination is often made by a jury, whose
deliberations are not public and not subject to meaningful appellate review.192 This
process hinders the development of clear laws concerning the proper application of
the various Georgia-Pacificfactors.193 Simply giving a list of fifteen Georgia-Pacific
factors to a jury without supervision by judges gives the jury full authority in
determining a reasonable royalty amount, which creates the potential of exorbitant

wrong with using the [EMVR], especially when there is no established market value for the
infringing component or feature, so long as the multiplier [i.e., the royalty rate] accounts for the
proportion of the base represented by the infringing component or feature."); Elacqua, supra note
178, at 28-30.
185Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia-Pacific
Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 46 (2008); Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1121 ("The
portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from nonpatented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or
improvements added by the infringer.").
18cKappos, supra note 3, at 15.
187Id.
188Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101761, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 2011) (stating that "damages experts must provide evidence tending to separate or
apportion the defendant's profits and the patentees damages between the patented feature and the
unpatented features").
18) Id.
190Elacqua, supra note 178, at 28-30.
191 Id.
193 See, e.g., Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1060 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 165 (D. Mass. 2000).
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damages awards.194 Also contributing to the problem is that Georgia-Pacific cites
little precedent to support the Georgia-Pacificanalysis.195
Some of the Georgia-Pacific factors are helpful in the calculation, but judges
should only allow evidence based on factors that are tied to the economic value
added.196 The courts may realistically consider whether there is "economic proof'
with "factual predicates" for the Georgia-Pacificfactors.197
Particularly, factors six, eleven, and thirteen respectively deal with the
economic value added including:
(6) the effect of selling the patented
feature in promoting sales of other products; (11) the extent to which the
alleged infringer has made use of the patented technology and the value of
that use; and (13) the portion of realizable profit that should be credited to
the patented technology as opposed to non-patented elements.198
Thus, a simplification of the Georgia-Pacific factors can be of assistance in the
determination of a reasonable royalty. 99 Requiring the use of only comparable
licenses should serve to focus a jury's deliberations on reliable and less confusing
evidence.

C. Courts Must Play a Much Larger Gatekeeping Role
Congress should require courts to conduct thorough Daubert hearings on patent
damages.
Requiring strong gatekeeping by the courts will help to encourage
innovation. 200 "Despite the existence of the Daubert framework that permits judges
to serve as gatekeepers in evaluating expert testimony, actual exclusions of
testimony on patent damages are rare." 20 1 In a review of Federal Circuit cases since
1993, Atanu Saha and Roy Weinstein, found merely six rulings on Daubert motions
with respect to reasonable royalties. 202 In only two of those cases did courts exclude
testimony about reasonable royalties--"one involving a patentee witness and one
involving the accused infringer witness." 203 In district court cases since 2000, they
191 Janicke, supra note 54, at 10-11; PATENT DAMAGES HANDBOOK COMMITTEE MEMBERS,
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ISSUES IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES: A HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 1 (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 2010 Emerging Issues 4839 ("There is 'no
formula by which these factors can be rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by
which their economic significance can be automatically transduced into their pecuniary
equivalent."').
195Georgia-Pacific,318 F. Supp. at 1120.
196 Elacqua, supra note 178, at 30; Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.

'97 Id.
200 Id.; Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LE XIS 75504, at *14 (S.D. Cal.
July 13, 2011) ('Under Daubert, the court is charged with a 'gatekeeping function' to ensure expert
testimony is both reliable and relevant.").
201Durie & Lemley, supra note 109, at 635.
202Id.
203s
Id.
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found thirty-nine rulings related to reasonable royalty awards-"six excluded the
patentee's expert testimony on reasonable royalty, with another three excluding the
patentee expert's testimony in part."204
Requiring these Daubert motions will force judges to allow only reliable evidence
in patent damages cases and force parties to more carefully select their evidence,
with knowledge that such evidence will be more closely scrutinized. 205 When judges
more aggressively utilize their gatekeeper powers in this way, juries are presented
with more reliable and less confusing information to be used when determining a
reasonable royalty amount.

IV. CONCLUSION
The reasonable royalty calculation remains confusing because there are
numerous methods of calculation including several that appear rather arbitrary.
This has the effect of overcompensating patentees and driving up damages awards
which goes against the goal of encouraging innovation. 206 Although the courts have
had some success in establishing new methods, Congress should create a more rigid
and clear test for all. 207 Establishing clear rules for damages experts to calculate a
reasonable royalty amount creates certainty and improves the efficiency of
intellectual property markets. 208 When juries receive a clear methodology for
calculating a reasonable royalty amount, they have the power to render a more fair
judgment. This power is enhanced when judges are required to scrutinize the
parties' evidence, which results in the jury obtaining access to only reliable evidence
that is based in sound economic and factual predicates. The effect will be to reduce
the amount of damage awards and provide additional incentive for inventors to
continue to develop new products.
"The first step in winning the future is
encouraging ... innovation, [which] doesn't just change our lives, [but] determines
how we make our living.... Success in this new and changing world will require
reform, responsibility, and innovation."209

20

Id.

Id.; Allen W. Hinderaker, EXPERT TESTIMONY: HOLY WATER OR VINEGAR? 1 (July 19, 2011),
available at 2011 Emerging Issues 5766 ("Factual testimony that masquerades as expert opinion is
inadmissible expert testimony.
Expert opinion that lacks a reliable basis in fact is also
inadmissible.").
2o6 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
207Kyl, supra note 12, at S9982-83.
205
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